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Abstract
Proofs of space (PoS) [Dziembowski et al., CRYPTO’15] are proof systems where a prover can
convince a verifier that he “wastes” disk space. PoS were introduced as a more ecological and
economical replacement for proofs of work which are currently used to secure blockchains like
Bitcoin. In this work we investigate extensions of PoS which allow the prover to embed useful
data into the dedicated space, which later can be recovered.
Our first contribution is a security proof for the original PoS from CRYPTO’15 in the
random oracle model (the original proof only applied to a restricted class of adversaries which
can store a subset of the data an honest prover would store). When this PoS is instantiated
with recent constructions of maximally depth robust graphs, our proof implies basically optimal
security.
As a second contribution we show three different extensions of this PoS where useful data
can be embedded into the space required by the prover. Our security proof for the PoS extends
(non-trivially) to these constructions. We discuss how some of these variants can be used as
proofs of catalytic space (PoCS), a notion we put forward in this work, and which basically is
a PoS where most of the space required by the prover can be used to backup useful data. Finally
we discuss how one of the extensions is a candidate construction for a proof of replication
(PoR), a proof system recently suggested in the Filecoin whitepaper.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Proofs of Space (PoS)
A proof of space (PoS) [16, 30, 3] is an interactive proof system in which a prover P can
convince a verifier V that it “wastes” a large amount of disk-space. PoS were suggested as
an alternative to proofs of work (PoW), which are currently used for securing blockchains
including Bitcoin and Ethereum. PoS-based proposals include Spacemint [27] and the Chia
network [1]. In the full version of this paper [29] we provide more discussion on sustainable
blockchains and PoS.
The core of the pebbling-based PoS [16, 30] is a mode of operation for hash-functions
EPoS◦ which is specified by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V,E) with a dedicated
set VC ⊆ V of |VC | = N “challenge nodes”. The constructions in [16, 30] mostly differ in
1 This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 682815/TOCNeT).
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Prover P Verifier V
random oracle H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}w
shared inputs: a DAG G = (V,E), VC ⊆ V, |V | = N , of indegree δ.
parameters: block size w, data/waste ratio κ (only in PoCSF),
µ controlling soundness of exectution phase.
data ~d = (d1, . . . , dN ), di ∈ {0, 1}κ·w
χ← {0, 1}w
~c← V µC
accept if verify(φ~`,~c, ~o) = 1
(φ~`, φ+~` ) := commit(~`)
~` := EPoXX(χ) (cf. Figure 2)
store
χ ∈ {0, 1}w, ~`= {`′i}i∈VC ∈ {0, 1}N ·λ
φ+~` ∈ {0, 1}(N−1)·w (cf. Remark 4.7)
store
χ ∈ {0, 1}w, φ~` ∈ {0, 1}w
~o := open(~`, φ+~` ,~c)
initialization phase
statement χ
commitment φ~`
prove that φ~`“mostly correct”
cf. Remark 4.7
execution phase
challenge ~c
answer ~o
Figure 1 Illustration of protocol structure of the proof of space PoS◦, our proofs of catalytic
space PoCSF,PoCSφ and the proof of replication PoR (replace PoXX in the figure with any of those).
In PoCSF κ is a parameter, in PoCSφ,PoR set κ = 1 and for PoS◦ set κ = 0 (i.e., ~d is empty) in the
figure. The label size λ is w(κ+ 1) in PoCSF and w in PoS◦,PoR and PoCSφ.
what type of graphs are used. The only input EPoS◦ takes is a short statement χ which is
used to sample a hash function Hχ (modelled as random oracle in all our proofs), and it
outputs a large file ~`= {`i}i∈VC which P must store. P sends a commitment φ~` to ~` to V. To
check the prover really stores this file, the verifier can occasionally send a random challenge
i ∈ VC to the prover, who then must open the label `i ∈ ~` of this file. If such audits happen
sufficiently often, the rational thing for P to do is to store ~`, and not recompute labels as
they are requested. The high level proof structure of this PoS, denoted PoS◦, is illustrated
in Figure 1, the underlying mode of operation, denoted EPoS◦ , is illustrated in Figure 2.
1.2 An Uncoditional Security Proof for the [16] PoS
Informally, the security we want from a PoS is as follows: if a malicious prover P˜ dedicates
slightly less space than the honest prover would after the initialization phase, say (1− ) ·N
instead N for some small  > 0, then it should be “expensive” for him to pass the audit.
Note that P˜ can always pass the audit by simply recomputing the entire ~` right before the
audit, so the best we can hope for is that passing the audit is almost as expensive for P˜ as it
is to compute the entire ~`.
The first contribution in this paper is a security proof that shows PoS◦ is a secure PoS in
the random oracle model (Corollary 8 in §7.2). The existing proof from [16] only showed
security against restricted adversaries who store a subset of the data ~` an honest prover
would store, but didn’t imply anything against more general adversaries who can store an
arbitrary function of this data. We discuss this in more detail in §5.
When we instantiate EPoS◦ with recent constructions of depth-robust graphs, the security
we get is basically optimal. Informally, for any  > 0, we can chose parameters such that
any cheating prover who dedicates only an 1 − α fraction of the required space will fail
to efficiently answer an α −  fraction of the challenges (which simply ask to open some
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EPoS◦ : The proof of space from [DFKP15]
instantiated with (a toy example of) a depth-
robust graph.
EPoR: Our proof of replication is similar to
EPoCSφ , but the data is XOR’ed to the lables as
the computation goes on, not just at the end.
χ `1 `2 `3 `4 `5 `6Hχ
EPoCSφ : Our proof of catalytic space where
the data is committed by a standard Merkle
tree commitment φd. The hash function for
this commitment depends on χ, the hash func-
tion for the labelling also on φd.
EPoCSF : Our efficiently updatable proof of
catalytic space where the catalytic data com-
mitted via random invertible function F.
`i = Hχ(i, `p1 , . . . , `pδi ) VC = {3, 4, 5, 6}
`i = Hχ(i, `p1 , . . . , `pδi ) for all i ∈ V
`′i = `i ⊕ Fχ(di˜) for i ∈ VC
χ
`1 `2 `3 `4 `5 `6
`′3 `
′
4 `
′
5 `
′
6
d1 d2 d4d3
Fχ
`i = Hχ,φd(i, `p1 , . . . , `pδi ) for all i ∈ V
`′i = `i ⊕ di˜ for i ∈ VC
χ
`1 `2 `3 `4 `5 `6
`′3 `
′
4 `
′
5 `
′
6
d1 d2 d4d3
φd
Hχ
`i =
{
Hχ,φd(i, `p1 , . . . , `pδi ) if i ∈ V \ VC
Hχ,,φd(i, `p1 , . . . , `pδi )⊕ di˜ if i ∈ VC
χ d1 d2 d4d3
φd
Hχ
`1 `2 `3 `4 `5 `6
Figure 2 Illustration of the graph based modes of operation used in the proof of space PoS◦, proof
of catalytic space PoCSφ and its efficiently updatable variant PoCSF and the proof of replication
PoR. We use a toy example of a depth robust DAG G = (V,E), V = {1, . . . , 6} with VC = {3, . . . , 6}
being the challenge nodes. The embedded data is shown in blue, the labels the prover stores are in
red. The values represented by all nodes are in {0, 1}w, except the bold nodes in PoCSF, where the
di are in {0, 1}w·κ and the `i`′i, i ∈ VC are in {0, 1}w·(κ+1).
blocks in the file ~` the prover is committed to). Thus, if say α = 2, the prover fails on an 
fraction, and we can amplify this to be overwhelmingly close to 1 by using O(1/) challenges
in parallel. Above, with “efficiently recover”, we mean it needs parallel time2 N , this is
basically optimal in terms of time complexity, as running the entire initialization phase takes
only (sequential) time 4N . We will discuss how our proof compares with existing results in
more detail in §2.
The efficiency of our schemes (i.e., proof size, proof generation time, proof verification
time) are all in O(logN), where the hidden constant depends on the above mentioned  (i.e.,
the constant grows as  goes to 0).
1.3 Embedding Useful Data into a PoS
The file ~` := EPoS◦(χ) the prover is supposed to store just wastes disk space, and cannot
be used for anything useful. This makes sense, as after all a PoS is supposed to prove the
dedicated space is wasted.
In this paper we investigate the setting where the space dedicated towards the PoS can
at the same time be used to encode some useful data ~d. We identify two applications for
such objects, proofs of replication (PoR), which were (informally) introduced in the Filecoin
2 Our proof is in the random oracle model, and parallel time N means N rounds of queries, where in
each round one can make many queries in parallel. In sequential time just one query is allowed.
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paper [23] and proofs of catalytic space (PoCS), which we introduce and motivate in this
work. The naming of the latter is inspired by catalytic space computations [9, 10], which are
computations that can be done in small space, but only if one is additionally given “catalytic
space”. This space is initially filled with arbitrary (potentially incompressible) data, and
must be in the same state after the computation finishes. It thus functions like a catalyst in
chemical reactions.
We introduce three new proof systems which allow for such embedded data. Two of them
are intended to be used as PoCS, denoted PoCSφ and PoCSF. The PoCSF scheme has a worse
rate than PoCSφ, by which we mean the ratio ‖~d‖/‖~`‖ of embedded data vs. dedicated space,
but unlike PoCSφ, it allows for efficient updates of the embedded data. The third scheme
we introduce is called PoR and is intended to be used as a PoR. Our new proof systems are
derived from the [16] PoS PoS◦ by replacing its underlying mode EPoS◦ by another mode of
operation EPoXX ∈ {EPoCSφ ,EPoCSF ,EPoR}. These modes take as input χ (just like EPoS◦), and
additionally some data ~d = {di}i∈VC and output a file ~` := EPoXX(χ, ~d) to be stored. The
data ~d can be recovered from ~` at any time. These four modes are all illustrated in Figure 2.
1.4 Fisch’s PoR
That depth-robust graphs are useful to construct proofs of replication has been observed
independently by Ben Fisch, he discusses this in a BPASE’18 talk3 which took place almost
a month before this paper was posted in a public archive.
In a recent paper [18] Fisch starts developing the foundations of PoR. His paper addresses
many conceptual and technical aspects of PoR, including PoR constructions based on depth-
robust graphs similar to the ones in this paper. His security proofs crucially use the main
technical from this paper, i.e., that pebbling lower bounds for parallel time complexity imply
lower bounds in the random oracle model as stated in Theorem 7. In a subsequent work Fisch
presents PoR based on depth robust graphs with even better provable security guarantees [19].
The construction in that paper is conceptually somewhat different from ours in terms of
the underlying graphs but also in the way in which the data is embedded. The graphs are
stacked depth robust graphs, and are somewhat reminiscent of the simple and elegant PoS of
Ren and Devadas [30] which is based on stacked expanders. We’ll say more on the efficiency
of those constructions in §2.
1.5 Properties of PoS, PoCS and PoR
Fisch [18] observes that for any meaningful definition of PoR, a a PoR necessarily is also a
PoS as defined in [16]. Also a PoCS must necessarily be a PoS.
We (non-trivially) extend our security proof for PoS◦ to prove that also the schemes
PoCSφ,PoCSF,PoR are PoS (The final bound for PoS◦,PoCSφ,PoR is stated in Corallary 8
in §8.2, the bound for PoCSF is in the full version [29]. On the other hand, we observe
that being a PoS with the option to embed useful data is not sufficient to constitute a good
PoCS or PoR. Moreover the “whish list” of properties one might have for PoCS and PoR is
somewhat contradictory. Our PoR candidate PoR is not a good PoCS, while PoCSφ,PoCSF
do not make for a good PoR, as we’ll elaborate next.
The most important property we want from a PoCS is that any particular block of data
from ~d = {di}i∈VC cannot be recovered too efficiently from ~`. The reason is that otherwise
the PoCS wouldn’t compose: a malicious prover P˜ could run a PoCS for some statement χ,
3 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8_9ONpyRZEI
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and at the same time using the embedded data ~d for a PoCS for other statement χ′, thus
pretending to dedicate more space than it does. To prevent this, we want the PoCS to lock
the catalytic data, by which we mean accessing any particular block di ∈ ~d should be almost
as expensive as recovering the entire ~d from ~`.
In a typical application of a PoR, the data ~d is not chosen by P but provided by V,
together with some replication parameter r ∈ N (and statement χ). P will then run the
PoR for various statements χ1, . . . , χr (generated from χ), each embedding ~d. Informally,
the security property we want is that a prover who later successfully passes the audits must
have stored r redundant copies of ~d (as ~d can be incompressible, the redundancy requirement
implies that PoR is a PoS). So unlike for a PoCS, in a PoR, being able to recover any data
block efficiently is actually a feature, not an issue that breaks security.
We’ll discuss those properties and how our schemes do or don’t achieve them in more
detail in §4, after having defined our various modes. We’ll keep the discussion about the
exact notion of a PoCS or PoR, and in particular any properties beyond being a PoS, like
the locking and replication property mentioned above, informal. We expect future work to
come up with the right definition for a PoCS, and also [18] is probably also not the last
word on definitional issues for PoRs. There certainly are more properties one might need
from a PoR or PoCS in particular applications that have not yet been identified, coming
up with the right definitions and constructions satisfying them (in particular, showing that
the constructions presented in this work do or do not satisfy them) is a promising research
agenda.
2 Comparison With Previous Work
We somewhat divert from [16] when formally defining the security as a PoS. In [16], a PoS
is defined to be (N0, N1, T )-secure if an adversary who stores a file ~`˜ of size N0 (recall
that we measure size in blocks, typically of size something like w = 256 bits) after the
initialization phase, uses N1 space and T time during the proof executing phase, will fail in
making the verifier accept with overwhelming probability. Below we shortly compare the
four pebbling-based instantiations of the PoS◦ construction that so far have been suggested,
and what security has been proven for them. Those just differ in the graphs G = (V,E) and
the dedicated set of challenge vertices VC ⊆ V, |VC | = N . We also mention the total number
of edges |E|, as this basically determines the efficiency of the initialization procedure, and
the indegree δ, as this determines the size of the proofs and also the time to generate and
verify proof. Let us mention that there is one work [3] constructing PoS using a completely
different approach than graph-pebbling, for space reasons we’ll only discuss his in the full
version [29].
2.1 The original PoS [16]
[16] introduced the notion of PoS and gave two constructions, the first is
(Θ(N/ log(N)), N/ log(N),∞)-secure with |V | = N, δ = 2, |E| = 2N
and based on a graph with high space pebbling complexity by Paul, Tarjan and Celoni [28],
the second uses a rather sophisticated construction combining random bipartite graphs,
superconcentrators and depth-robust graphs [17] and is
(Θ(N),∞,Θ(N))-secure with |V | = N, δ ∈ O(log logN), |E| ∈ O(N log logN))
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2.2 The Ren-Devadas PoS [30]
Ren and Devadas [30] propose a very elegant instantiation of PoS◦ using stacked expanders
and give a proof for it which in terms of security improves upon both constructions from [16]
(just |E| is asymptotically larger). For any α ∈ [0, 0.5], their proof implies security (almost)
(α ·N, (1− α) ·N,∞)-secure with|V | ∈ O(N logN), δ ∈ O(1), |E| ∈ O(N logN)
For say α = 1/3, this means an adversary storing N0 = N/3 blocks after initialization, must
use at least N1 = 2N/3 space during execution. Their construction is a stack of log(N)
expanders of indegree 2, and VC is the graph on top of this stack.
2.3 Fisch’s tight PoS [19]
The PoS underlying Fisch’s recent PoR construction which we shortly discussed in §1.4, is
based on a PoS that for any  > 0 achieves
(N · (1− ),∞, N)-security with|V | = O(N log(1/)), δ ∈ O(1), |E| ∈ O(N log(1/))
Fisch provides concrete bounds for all the constants, the bounds are so good that he gets a
very practical construction for parameters where the proofs guarantee good practical security.
For our construction, which we discuss below, this is not the case. As there’s a huge gap
between the lower and upper bounds on the security we can prove for PoS based on the simple
depth robust graphs from [4, 6], it’s not clear whether the actual security of the “stacked”
constructions as used in [19, 30] really is practically better, or if those constructions just
allow for much tighter proofs, while not actually having better security in practice. Settling
this is an interesting open question.
2.4 Our PoS
In this work we use the depth-robust graphs from [4, 6] to instantiate PoS◦, and also our
three new constructions which allow to embed useful data. For any  > 0, we can instantiate
it as to get
(N · (1− ),∞, N)-security with|V | = 4N, δ ∈ O(log(N)), |E| ∈ O(N logN)
This might not seem terribly impressive, note that unlike [30] we don’t claim any lower
bound on N1, the space a cheating adversary must dedicate during proof execution. And
asymptotically, |E| is larger than in the second construction of [16] which (ignoring constants)
has the same security. But as we’ll explain next, we improve upon all existing constructions,
except the subsequent work by Fisch [19], in three crucial points.
1. Unconditional Proof: Our proof holds unconditionally (in the random oracle model),
whereas [16, 30] only argued security against restricted adversaries who store a subset of
the file an honest prover would store. Let us mention that for such relaxed adversaries,
we can also prove bounds on the space a successful prover needs during execution.4
4 Basically, for this restricted class of adversaries, whatever bound on time and/or space is proven for
the underlying graph translates to a time and/or space bound for the construction. Our unconditional
proof only translates parallel time complexity. The graphs we use to instantiate our construction are
depth-robust, and such graphs are known [5] to have high “cumulative pebbling complexity”, which
(for restricted adversaries as just mentioned) translates to the fact that if adversary runs in T rounds
during proof execution, it must use Ω(N2/T ) space on average during this computation.
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2. Tight Bound: We get tight security: for any constant  > 0, we can instantiate our
PoS to be ((1− ) ·N,∞, N) secure. Equivalently, an adversary storing just an  fraction
less than the honest prover, and which can run in time T = N , will still fail to make the
verifier accept with overwhelming probability.
Having such a tight bound is crucial for many applications, as it means we get security
against an adversary dedicating an (1− ) fraction of the space for any  > 0. Note that
even the (proof of the) [30] construction doesn’t imply any security against adversary
who dedicates just N0 = N/2, i.e., half the claimed space.
3. Security Against Parallelism: The security we prove even holds if we strengthen the
meaning of the parameter T from “total number of oracle queries”, to “total number of
parallel oracle queries”, where each parallel query can contains many inputs, as long as
in total they are bound by an exponential.
This stronger security notion implies that even massive parallelism doesn’t help a potential
adversary. This is useful in a setting where the timepoint at which audits happen is not
known to the prover (in proofs of replication this can be achieved), and we have a bound
on the latency of network between prover and verifier (so the prover cannot make T = N
sequential computations in time less than this latency). Here we can be sure a prover
who passes the audits really dedicates the claimed space, and does not simply reinitalize
the entire space once the audit starts fast enough using massive parallelism. Compare
this to the construction from [30], which can be initalized in sequential time log(N) using
parallelism N .
We will not use the formalism from [16] to quantify security outside of this subsection, but
in our security statements explicitly state what is achieved, which should be easier to parse.
The PoS security of EPoS◦ is stated in Corollary 8, The PoS security of EPoCSφ and EPoR in
Corollary 13 and the PoS security of EPoCSF in the full version [29].
3 Basic Notation and Definitions
3.1 Notation
For an object X, ‖X‖ denotes its bitlength, for a set ~x, |~x| is the number of elements in ~x. For
an integerm we denote [m] def= {1, 2, . . . ,m} and for a, b ∈ R we denote [a, b] def= {c : a ≤ c ≤ b}.
With {0, 1}≤m we denote the set of strings of length ≤ m.
We typically use small greek letters ι, δ, ω, µ, ν, , . . . for our parameters used to quantify
security, efficiency etc.. An exception is N which throughout denotes the space requirement
of a prover. All these parameters are values in N except  which is in [0, 1]. For the security
games considered in this paper we use capital greek letters Φ,Λ. The sans-serif font is used
for interactive systems like parties V,P, P˜,A (modelled as randomized interactive Turing
machines), functions H,F, g, f or algorithms like commitments discussed below (V,P and
P˜ are reserved for an honest verifier, an honest prover, and a potentially malicious prover,
respectively). We use bold letters ~`, ~d, ~o,~c, . . . for sets (usually ordered) of values, except
for graph notation where we use simply G = (V,E) to denote a graph with vertices V and
directed edges E.
We will often consider a subset VC ⊂ N, |VC | = N of challenge nodes. It will be convenient
to define concise notion for mapping VC to [N ], which we do using a tilde, i.e.,
VC = (v1, . . . , vN ) ⇒ (v˜1, . . . , v˜N ) = (1, . . . , N) (1)
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3.2 Random Oracles
3.2.1 Fresh Random Oracles.
If H is a fixed random oracle and z ∈ {0, 1}∗, we denote with Hz the function Hz(·) = H(z, ·).
If z is random and long enough (concretely, the amount of non-uniform advice an adversary
has on H is a not too large exponential in ‖z‖), we can treat Hz as a fresh uniformly random
oracle [14]. We do this repeatedly in this work without always explicitly mentioning it.
3.2.2 The Parallel Random Oracle Model.
We prove security of our schemes in the parallel random oracle model, where in every round an
adversary can output a set x1, . . . , xi of queries, and it receives the outputs H(x1), . . . ,H(xi)
at the beginning of the next round. For us the number of rounds will be important, but the
total number of queries is secondary. Although also the total number of queries must be
bound, in our proofs it can be as large as exponential in the block size w, and for the basic
PoS◦, the number of queries during the initialization phase can be even unbounded (not so
for the other schemes). We will denote the number of oracle queries to H an adversary is
allowed to make in the initialization and proof execution phase by qH1 and qH2 , respectively.
3.3 Commitments
We will make extensive use of a Merkle-tree commitment scheme, which allows to compute
a short commitment to a long string, and later efficiently open any particular location of
that long string. It is specified by a triple of algorithms commit, open, verify which use a
hash-function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}w as a building block. For the security as a commitment
scheme, it’s sufficient for H to be collision resistant. In our proofs we will sometimes need to
extract committed values from the commiting party, for this we must assume H is given as
an oracle so our reduction can observe all queries.
If it’s relevant what hash function is used it’s shown as superscript (otherwise one can
just assume any collision-resistant hash function is used). A party A which wants to commit
to values ~x = (x1, . . . , xm) invokes
(φ~x, φ+~x ) := commit
H(~x)
here φ+~x ∈ {0, 1}(m−1)w denotes the values of all inner nodes in the Merkle-tree, which are
required to later efficiently open any position in ~x, and φ~x ∈ {0, 1}w is the value at the root,
which is the commitment.
Once A announces φ~x it is committed to ~x. It can then open any subset ~i ⊆ [m] of the
committed values (i.e., {xi}i∈~i) by invoking
~o := openH(~x, φ+~x ,~i) ∈ {0, 1}≤|
~i|dlog(m)e·w .
Everyone can verify that ~o is the correct opening by invoking verifyH(φ~x,~i, ~o) and accepting
iff this value is 1.
3.4 Random Strings are Incompressible
In our proofs we’ll repeatedly use the following fact, which states that a random string cannot
be compressed.
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I Fact 1 (statement from [13]). For any randomized encoding procedure enc : {0, 1}r ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m and decoding procedure dec : {0, 1}r × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n where
Pr
x←{0,1}n,ρ←{0,1}r
[dec(ρ, enc(ρ, x)) = x] ≥ δ
we have m ≥ n− log(1/δ).
4 Overview of Our Modes and Protocols
In this section we will formally define the mode EPoS◦ underlying the PoS from [16] and our
new modes EPoR,EPoCSφ ,EPoCSF as illustrated in Figure 2. The actual protocols using those
modes as illustrated in Figure 1 will then be defined in §4.5. As we define the modes, we
will also continue our discussion from §1 showing how they (fail to) perform as PoCS or
PoR. In particular, we’ll show that our mode EPoR is not locking (and thus not suitable as
PoCS), whereas EPoCSφ ,EPoCSF do not imply replication. All the modes are defined over a
DAG G = (V,E), for i ∈ V we denote with parents(i) = {j : (j, i) ∈ E} the parents of i, and
we define ~`parents(i) = {`j : j ∈ parents(i)}.
4.1 The Mode EPoS◦
In the basic PoS the file ~` := EPoS◦(χ) contains the “labels” of nodes in VC , where the labels
of the nodes of the underlying DAG G = (V,E) are computed in topological order by hashing
(using a fresh random oracle sampled using χ) the labels of its parents
∀i ∈ V : `i = Hχ(i, ~`parents(i)) , ~` def= {`i}i∈VC (EPoS◦) (2)
The most obvious way to somehow embed data ~d = {di}i∈[N ] into this basic PoS is to simply
XOR the data blocks to the labels in VC . There are two natural ways to do this, XOR the
data to the labels as the computation goes on, or first compute the labels and then XOR
the data to it. The first approach is basically what we do in our construction PoR, and the
second in PoCSφ. Before computing the labels, we first commit to ~d, and then sample a
fresh random oracle to compute the labels using this commitment. We’ll explain below why
without this trick our constructions would miserably fail to be PoS.
4.2 The Mode EPoR
In our PoR ~` := EPoR(χ, ~d), the data ~d = {di}i∈[N ] is first committed
(φ~d, φ
+
~d
) := commitHχ(~d) .
Then φ~d is used to sample a fresh random oracle Hχ,φ~d(·) = Hχ(φ~d, ·), which is then used to
compute the labels. For labels of a node i ∈ VC , one additionally XORs the data block di˜
(recall that {˜i}i∈VC = [N ]) to the label right after it has been computed.
`i =
{
Hχ,φ~d(i, ~`parents(i)) if i ∈ V \ VC
Hχ,φ~d(i, ~`parents(i))⊕ di˜ if i ∈ VC
, ~`= {`i}i∈VC (EPoR) (3)
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4.3 The Mode EPoCSφ
In our PoCS ~` := EPoCSφ(χ, ~d) one first computes φ~d as above, uses this to sample a fresh
random oracle Hχ,φ~d to compute labels (as in the basic PoS◦), and only then XORs the data
to the labels to be stored
∀i ∈ V : `i = Hχ,φ~d(i, ~`parents(i)) (4)
∀i ∈ VC : `′i = `i ⊕ di˜ , ~`= {`′i}i∈VC (EPoCSφ) (5)
As mentioned above, the fact that the random oracle Hχ,φ~d used to computed the labels
depends on the commitment φ~d to ~d is crucial, let us sketch why. Assume we’d change
Hχ,φ~d to Hχ in the definition of EPoCSφ . Now a malicious prover (in the protocol PoCSφ to
be defined in §4.5) could set the `′i to be stored to whatever it wants (and thus also store
them using low space). Only after choosing the `′i, it then fixes the data ~d = {di}i∈[N ] by
“equivocating” it, i.e., setting it as di˜ := `′i ⊕ `i, so everything is consistent. This malicious
behaviour (not using any space) cannot be distinguished from honest behaviour, thus it’s
not a PoS.
Now let us observe that PoCSφ is not a good PoR, as it doesn’t imply replication. A
prover who is supposed to compute and store ~`i := PoCSφ(χi, ~d) for r statements χ1, . . . , χr
but the same ~d can instead store ~d once in the clear, and for then for each χj only store the
labels {`i}i∈VC as in eq.(4) instead {`′i = `i ⊕ di˜}i∈VC , i.e., avoid the XORing step of eq.(5).
Note that this prover has only stored one copy of ~d, instead of storing it r times redundantly,
while it can still pass the audits for all χi, i ∈ [r] because it can compute the correct labels
`′i using its single copy of ~d as `′i = `i ⊕ di˜. The prover here doesn’t seem to gain much, in
particular it doesn’t save on space by deviating from the honest behaviour. But in a PoR we
probably want to enforce replication, or at least argue that it’s not rational for a prover to
deviate, and there are settings where deviating as just explained can be rational. Assume the
prover has large remote storage space, but only low bandwidth to access it. By deviating as
explained, it can use the space for the r proofs without large communication, in particular,
without ever having to send ~d to the remote disk.
In the other direction one can argue that EPoR is not a good PoCS as given all la-
bels {`i}i∈V as in eq.(3), one can efficiently recover the embedded data as di˜ = `i ⊕
Hχ,φ~d(i, ~`parents(i)), so it doesn’t provide the locking property we want from a PoCS. The
above argument highlights a problem with the PoCS security of EPoR, but is not totally
convincing, as the prover actually only needs to store the `i for i ∈ VC (not all i ∈ V ), so it
couldn’t necessarily recover those labels efficiently.
4.4 The Mode EPoCSF
Besides PoCSφ, we propose a second PoCS PoCSF, which allows for efficient updates. Instead
of committing to ~d and using this commitment to sample the random oracle Hχ,φ~d for
computing the labels as in PoCSφ, in PoCSF the labels are computed directly using Hχ, i.e.,
independently of ~d. To prevent the “equivocation” attack outlined above, in PoCSF the
prover samples (using χ) a random invertible function Fχ : {0, 1}(κ+1)·w → {0, 1}κ·w and
applies it to the data before XORing it to the label, where κ is a parameter discussed below.
The labels `i, i ∈ V \ VC have length w bits, the labels `i, i ∈ VC are (κ + 1) · w bits long.
Below Hχ : {0, 1}≤ι → {0, 1}(κ+1)·w, and Hχ(·)|w means we cap the output after w bits.
`i =
{
Hχ(i, ~`parents(i)) if i ∈ VC
Hχ(i, ~`parents(i))|w if i ∈ V \ VC
(6)
∀i ∈ VC : `′i = `i ⊕ Fχ(di˜) , ~`= {`′i}i∈VC (EPoCSφ) (7)
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A random invertible function Fχ as used in this construction can be constructed efficiently,
and with almost no loss in concrete security (which is crucial for our application) instantiated
from a random oracle [21].
PoCSφ has a better rate than PoCSF. In PoCSφ we have rate ‖
~d‖
‖~`‖ = 1, so the stored file
~`
is as big as the data ~d that can be recovered from it.5 The rate of PoCSF is only ‖
~d‖
‖~`‖ =
κ
κ+1 .
For efficiency reasons the κ can’t be too large (κ ≈ 10 is reasonable, then the size of ~` is
≈ 10% larger than ~d).
But unlike PoCSφ, PoCSF allows for fast updates of the catalytic data: if P wants to
change a single data block di˜ (embedded in `′i = `i ⊕ Fχ(di˜)) to d′i˜ then it can simply replace
the label `′i with `′i ⊕ Fχ(di˜)⊕ Fχ(d′i˜). It then must also update the commitment (φ~`, φ+~` ),
but this takes only time log(N). For this update P actually needs to know the currently
embedded data block di˜. There are natural settings where ~d is readily available in the
clear. For example if the catalytic data ~d encoded in ~` is used as backup, and a working
copy of ~d is available in the clear. So we think this feature might be useful. This mode is
somewhat different than the other three modes considered. Below we define and analyze
the PoS◦,PoR,PoCSφ modes together as they’re very similar, but PoCSF is different, and for
space reasons the precise definitions and security proofs are only given in the full version [29].
I Remark (efficiently updatable PoR). Looking at Figure 2, one might wonder why there’s no
mode EPoRF , where the data ~d is first pre-processed by Fχ as in EPoCSF , but then XORed to
the labels right after they are computed (as in EPoR). The reason is that the only advantage
of preprocessing ~d using Fχ as in EPoCSF instead of committing to it as in EPoCSφ is the fact
that it makes updating data blocks cheap. But if we XOR the data to the labels right after
it has been computed as in EPoR, then updating a block in label `i, will also change all
subsequent labels `j , j > i, even if the hash function used to compute labels is independent
of ~d. Thus, this update is not cheap after all. It’n an interesting open problem to construct
a candidate for a PoR where data blocks can be efficiently updated.
4.5 The Protocols PoS◦,PoCSφ and PoR
The protocols we consider in this work are a generalization of the pebbling-based PoS
from [16] PoS◦, where we allow the prover to chose and embed additional data ~d into the
file ~` to be stored. We define PoS◦,PoCSφ,PoR together as they are very similar, we use
PoXX ∈ {PoS◦,PoCSφ,PoR} as placeholder for any of those constructions.
w,µ : A block length w (w = 256 is a typical value) and a statistical security parameter µ.
G : A directed acyclic graph G = (V,E) with max. indegree δ and a designated set VC ⊆ V
of “challenge nodes” of size N = |VC |.
H : A hash function, which for the proof is modelled as a random oracle H : {0, 1}≤ι → {0, 1}w
which takes inputs of length at most ι = (δ + 2) · w bits.
The space required by the honest prover is ≈ N · w = |VC | · w bits (we’ll discuss the exact
space requirement in Remark 4.7).
5 The prover also must store opening information φ+~` for a Merkle commitment, but as we’ll discuss in
Remark 4.7 this is small compared to ~`.
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4.6 Initialization
V picks a random statement χ ∈ {0, 1}w and sends it to P.
If PoXX 6= PoS◦, the prover P can choose any data ~d = {di}i∈[N ], di ∈ {0, 1}w and then
computes the file to store (if PoXX = PoS◦, ~d is empty)
~` := EPoXX(χ, ~d)
as shown in Figure 2 and explained in eq.(2)-(4).
Finally P computes the commitment (φ~`, φ+~` ) := commit(~`) for all the labels i ∈ VC , sends
the short commitment φ~` to V and locally stores the opening information φ+~` . This concludes
the initialization if we assume P is honest during this phase (we’ll discuss the general case in
Remark 4.7).
At the end of the initalization phase the verifier stores the short strings χ, φ~`. The prover
stores χ, φ+~` and additionally a large file ~`= {`i}i∈VC of size ‖~`‖ = w ·N .
4.7 Proof execution
The protocol where P(~`, χ, φ+~` ) convinces V(χ, φ~`) that it stores ~` is very simple. V samples
a few nodes from the challenge set ~c = (c1, . . . , cµ) ⊂ VC at random, and sends the challenge
~c to P. P sends openings ~o := open(~`, φ+~` ,~c) to the labels {`i˜}i∈~c to V, who then accepts iff
verify(φ~`,~c, ~o) = 1.
I Remark (prover is honest during initialization). For most of the paper we will assume that
even a malicious prover P˜ follows the protocol during the initialization phase (i.e., behaves
like the honest P). Of course we can’t make this assumption in practice, that’s why pebbling-
based PoS have an extra communication round at the end of the initialization phase where –
for some statistical security parameter ν – V challenges P˜ to open ν labels and their parents
to check that they were correctly computed. For this, P˜ initially sends a commitment to all
nodes V , not just VC , and (except for PoS◦) also a commitment to ~d. If P˜ committed to
labels {`∗i }i∈V where it cheated on an  fraction of the lables, i.e., for PoS◦ this means we
have `∗i 6= Hχ(i, `∗p1 , . . . , `∗pδi ), then P˜ will fail to pass this check with probability 1− (1− )
ν .
P˜ can still get away with cheating at a small fraction of labels, but one can easily take care
of this in the proof by assuming that storing such inconsistent labels can be done by P “for
free”. As this is a minor technicality in the proof, we ignore this as not to obfuscate the main
technical contributions.
I Remark (P’s space). The size of the file ~` is N · w bits, which is basically the same as the
(N − 1) ·w bits required to store the opening info φ+~` of the Merkle-tree commitment to ~`: on
the 0’th level of the tree (the leaves) we have the N labels, then on level 1 we have N/2 values,
on level 2 we have N/4 values, etc., for a total of N/2 +N/4 + . . .+ 2 + 1 = N − 1 labels
of internal nodes that constitute φ+~` . But the prover can decide to not store levels 1 . . . k,
thus saving only (N − 1)/2k blocks, while all values in the omitted layers can be recomputed
by hashing at most 2k leaf values (i.e., values from ~`). Thus, for say k = 5, the Merkle tree
requires just a 1/32 fraction of the space of ~`, but requires to hash 32 values. In practice
that wouldn’t be expensive as those leave labels can always be stored consecutively on a
disk, and thus reading them comes at small cost compared to reading the first random block
(and hashing 32 blocks is not expensive compared to a disk access). In the discussions in this
writeup we will thus mostly ignore the space required for storing the opening information φ+~` .
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5 The Main Proof Ideas
In this section we’ll discuss the main ideas used in the proofs of this paper, and give an
overview of the work we borrowed ideas from. Pebbling is a game played on directed acyclic
graphs (DAG), where a player can put pebbles on nodes of the graph according to some
rules, and its goal is usually to pebble some particular node or set of nodes using as few
“resources” as possible. There are various pebbling games one can consider, in this work
we just consider the basic black-pebbling game, where the player can put a pebble on a
node if all of its parents have pebbles. The resource considered is typically time (i.e., how
many rounds it takes) or space (i.e., the maximum number of pebbles on the graph at any
time), or combinations thereof. For example cumulative space (the sum of the number of
pebbles on the graph over all rounds) [5] and sustained space (the number of rounds at which
many pebbles were on the graph) [6] have been suggested to model memory-hard functions.
Another important distinction is between sequential and parallel strategies; a parallel player
can – in every round – put as many pebbles on the graph as he wants, whereas a sequential
player can put only one. For reasons discussed below, in this paper we will consider time
complexity in the parallel black-pebbling model.
As pebbling is a simple combinatorial game, it’s often possible to prove unconditional
lower bounds on the resources required to pebble some graphs, and in some cases one can
prove that these bounds imply lower bounds for problems in more interesting computational
models. In particular, if the pebbling game considered is “deterministic” in the sense that
the player is initially given the graph and a designated set of nodes to pebble, then one can
use an elegant proof strategy (coined “ex-post facto” in the paper [15] that introduced it) to
translate basically any pebbling lower bound to a corresponding lower bound in the random
oracle model for computing the “labels” of the designated set of nodes, where the label of a
node is the output of the random oracle on input the labels of its parents.6
Pebbling games capture most constructions of so called memory-hard functions (MHFs),
which are functions that require a lot of memory to be computed. One distinguishes
between data-independent MHFs, where the memory access pattern is independent of the
functions input, and more general data-dependent MHFs. The pebbling game capturing
data-independent MHFs is deterministic, but for data-dependent MHFs it’s randomized, for
this reason almost all security proofs for data-dependent MHFs need to make additional
assumptions on the adversary. An exception is the recent security proof for the data-
dependent MHF called SCRYPT [7], which proves that SCRYPT has high cumulative
memory complexity in the parallel random-oracle model. Despite the fact that here the
underlying pebbling game is randomized, their proof does not need to make any assumptions
on the adversarial behaviour.
Like data-dependent MHFs, also the pebbling game (called Φ and defined in §6.1)
underlying pebbling-based PoS [16, 30] is randomized. Prior to this work no pebbling-based
PoS had an unconditional security proof in the random oracle model; one had to assume
that an adversarial prover only stores a subset of the data the honest prover would store,
but not arbitrary functions of this data.7
6 The high-level idea of an “ex-post-facto” proof is to look at the execution of the game in the random
oracle model and translate this to a pebbling strategy, where every time a label is computed, we put a
pebble on the corresponding node. Now, if the resources (where a round the pebble game translates to
a round of queries to the random oracle, and a pebble translates to space requrired to store one label)
required by the labelling game are smaller than in the derived pebbling game, we can use the adversary
in the labelling game to compress the random oracle. But this is impossible as a uniformly random
string cannot be compressed, so we have a contradiction, and the labelling game must have used at
least as many resources as the lower bound for the corresponding pebbling game dictates.
7 In [16] some combinatorial conjectures were stated which – if true – would have implied that restricting
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The key observation that allows us to translate pebbling-lower bounds for a “randomized”
pebbling game like Φ to lower bounds for the “labelling game” ΛPoS◦ in the random oracle
model (this game is defined in §7.1) is already implicit in [7], and goes as follows: If the
complexity we consider is time complexity in the parallel black-pebbling game, then the
optimal pebbling strategy is oblivious to the randomness (which in our game is a random node
we need to pebble). Concretely, the strategy minimizing the number of rounds required is to
put in every round a pebble on every possible node (i.e., every node whose parents are pebbled).
We observe that the reason “ex-post facto” proofs can’t be done for randomized pebbling
games is that the adversaries’ pebbling strategy can depend on the game’s randomness, but
as just outlined, for parallel time complexity we can assume the adversary is oblivious to
the randomness, and this allows us to push through a pretty standard ex-post facto type
proof (proof of Theorem 7 in §7.2) showing that lower bounds on the hardness of the game
Φ imply lower bounds on the game ΛPoS◦ , which captures the security of PoS◦ as a PoS.
Very informally, the proof is a compression argument, which uses an adversary that is “too
successful” in computing the labels of nodes it is being challenged on into a compressing
encoding algorithm for the random oracle H. As a random oracle is incompressible, such an
encoding cannot exist, and we get a contradiction.
In Theorem 12 in §8.2 we extend this proof from the basic PoS◦ to the modes PoCSφ and
PoR. The problem we face is that now, the values this “too successful” adversary predicts
are not just outputs (i.e., labels `i as in EPoS◦) of the random oracle H, but now they are
of the form `i ⊕ di˜, where di˜ is chosen by the adversary itself. Thus we can’t readily use
the fact that we learned them to compress H. To solve this problem, we use the fact that
in PoCSφ,PoR, the adversary must first commit to the di’s, and this commitment is then
used to sample a fresh random oracle to compute the labels. We let our encoding algorithm
first runs this adversary who chooses the di’s and computes the commitment. From this
adversary we can extract all the di’s. Once these are known, the encoding proceeds basically
as for the basic PoS◦.
Extending the proof to show that our efficiently updatable PoCS PoCSF is a PoS is much
more challenging, and for space reasons we only provide the proof in the full version [29],
now only giving a high level idea of the challenges. In PoCSF the labels of the “too succesful”
adversary predicts are of the form `i ⊕ F(di˜), but the adversary has not committed to the
di’s before computing the di’s. The key idea is to replace in the security game the random
invertible function F : {0, 1}λ−w → {0, 1}λ with the composition of two randomly sampled
functions g(f(·)), where f : {0, 1}λ−w → {0, 1}w/2, g : {0, 1}w/2 → {0, 1}λ, and argue that
with high probability this game will behave like the original one (in particular, the adversary
is almost as successful here). In this new game, we can recover `i from the labels the adversary
predicts, which now are of the form `i ⊕ g(f(di˜)), if additionally given only the short w/2 bit
string f(di˜), this is good enough to get compression and again push through an ex-post-facto
type proof.
6 The Graph Pebbling Game Φ and its Hardness
In this section we define a pebbling game Φ and show it’s hard if instantiated with depth-
robust graphs. Later we will prove that hardness of Φ implies hardness of games capturing
the PoS security of our schemes.
adversaries like this is without loss of generality. But these conjectures have been beautifully refuted in
[24].
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6.1 The Pebbling Game Φ(G, VC)
The game is parameterized by a DAG G = (V,E), a subset VC ⊆ V of |VC | = N challenge
nodes, and an integer s, 0 ≤ s ≤ N . It is played by an adversary given as a pair AΦ =
{A1Φ,A2Φ}.
initialization: A1Φ gets no input, and outputs the initial pebbling configuration, which is a
subset P0 ⊆ V of |P0| = s nodes.
execution: A random challenge node c← VC is chosen.
A2Φ gets as input P0 and the challenge c. It then proceeds in rounds, starting at round 1.
In round i, A2Φ can place (arbitrary many) pebbles on the nodes of V to update the
pebbling configuration from Pi−1 to P ′i according to the following rule: a pebble can be
placed on node v ∈ V only if all the parents of v are pebbled in Pi−1. It then can remove
any number of pebbles to get the configuration Pi ⊆ P ′i .
I Definition 2 (hardness of the game Φ). For s, t ∈ N,  ∈ [0, 1], we say AΦ does (s, t, )-win
the pebbling game Φ(G, VC) (as defined above) if the probability (over the choice of c and
AΦ’s random coins) that A2Φ puts a pebble on c in t− 1 rounds or less is at most .
We say Φ(G, VC) is (s, t, )-hard if no such AΦ exists, that is, no adversary can pebble an
 fraction of VC in t rounds or less, having only s initial pebbles.
I Remark (greedy is best). We observe that the optimal strategy for A2Φ is trivial: the greedy
strategy, where in every round A2Φ puts pebbles on all nodes possible and never removes a
pebble, is at least as good as any other strategy. This greedy strategy is oblivious to the
challenge c, which will be crucial in our proofs.
6.2 Depth Robust Graphs
I Definition 3 (depth-robust graphs). A DAG G = (V,E) on V = |N | nodes is (e, d)-depth
robust if after removing any subset of e ·N nodes, there remains a path of length d ·N .
Such graphs were first considered by Erdős et al. [17], and recent work has made them more
practical, cf. [4, 6] and references therein. Concretely, for any  > 0, [6] constructs a family
{GN}N∈N of graphs of indegree O(logN) (here the hidden constant depends on ) which, for
any e, d, e+ d ≤ 1−  are (e, d)-depth robust.
Note that any graph, even the complete graph (which has indegree N − 1) is only (e, d)
depth-robust for e + d = 1. It is maybe surprising that one gets almost as good depth-
robustness as the complete graph with only O(logN) indegree (one the negative side, it’s
known that Ω(logN) indegree is necessary for this). Let us mention that the indegree of
the G we use to instantiate our schemes is important as the efficiency of our schemes (in
particular the proof size) depends linearly on it.
6.3 Φ(G, VC) is Hard if G is Depth Robust
Let us observe that the ΛPoS◦(G, VC) cannot be (s = N · ce, t,  = ce)-hard for any ce ∈ [0, 1]
even for tiny t = 1, as one always can simply put those s initial pebbles on an ce fraction of
VC , and this  = ce fraction is then already pebbled in round 1. By the lemma below, using
the depth-robust graphs G′4N the game becomes hard – i.e. we need t ≥ N rounds – for just
a slightly larger fraction  = ce + 4′.
I Lemma 4 (hardness of Φ with the depth-robust graphs from [6]). For any N ∈ N, ′ > 0
consider the graph G′4N from [6], which is (e, d)-depth robust for any e + d ≥ 1 − ′. Let
VC ⊂ V, |VC | = N be the N topologically last nodes in V . Then, for any ce ∈ [0, 1] the game
Φ(G′4N , VC) is (s, t, )-hard with
s = N · ce , t = N ,  = ce + 4′
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Proof. We can assume ′ ≤ 1/4 as the statement is void for  < 0. Let e = ce/4, then
s = e·4N and e ≤ 1/4 (as ce ≤ 1, which holds as for s ≥ N the statement is void). e+d ≥ 1−′
implies d ≥ 1 − e − ′. After removing s nodes (i.e., an e fraction) from V , by the (e, d)
depth-robustness, there’s still a path P ⊂ V of length at least d · 4N ≥ 4N(1− e− ′) ≥ 2N
in V \ S (second inequality using e ≤ 1/4 and ′ ≤ 1/4). All but 4N(e+ ′) of VC must lie
on this path (as the path contains all but 4N(e+ ′) of the vertices), i.e.,
|VC ∩ P |
N
≥ N − 4N(e+ 
′)
N
= 1− 4e− 4′ = 1− ce − 4′
The nodes in VC ∩ P are all at the end of the path P (as VC was chosen topologically last
in V ), and as |P | ≥ 2N, |VC | = N , each node in VC ∩ P has depth at least N in P , thus
the number of sequential pebbling queries required to put a pebble on any of those nodes is
t > N . Equivalently, only an  = 1− |VC∩P |N ≤ ce + 4′ fraction of VC can be pebbled in t
rounds or less, as claimed. J
7 PoS Security of PoS◦
In this Section we state and prove our main technical result Theorem 1, which states that
hardness of the pebbling game Φ implies hardness of a game ΛPoS◦ capturing the PoS security
of PoS◦. We start with defining the the ΛPoS◦ game
7.1 The Labelling Game ΛPoS◦(G, VC, w)
The game is parameterized by a DAG G = (V,E), a subset VC ⊆ V of |VC | = N challenge
nodes and a block size w. Moreover a function H∗ : {0, 1}≤ι → {0, 1}w, ι = (δ + 2) · w. Let
∀i ∈ V : `i = H∗(i, ~`parents(i)) (8)
(note that these are the labels PoS◦(χ) would compute if Hχ = H∗). The game is played by
an adversary APoS◦ = {A1PoS◦ ,A2PoS◦}
initialization: A1PoS◦ is given oracle access to H∗. It outputs a string (the initial state) S0 of
length ‖S0‖ = m bits (A1PoS◦ is computationally unbounded).
execution: A random challenge node c← VC is chosen.
A2PoS◦ gets as input S0 and the challenge c. It then proceeds in rounds, starting at round
1.
In round i, APoS◦ gets as input its state Si−1. It can either decide to stop the game by
outputting a single guess `guess (for `c), or it can make one parallel oracle query: on
query (x1, . . . , xqi) it receives (y1, . . . , yqi) where yi = H∗(xi). It can do any amount of
computation before and after this query, and at the end of the round output its state Si
for the next round.
I Definition 5 (hardness of the game ΛPoS◦). For m, t, qH2 , w, α ∈ N and pH, epsilon ∈ [0, 1],
we say APoS◦ = (A1PoS◦ ,A
2
PoS◦) does (m, t, , p, q
H
2 )-win the labelling game ΛPoS◦(G, C, w) (as
defined above) if for all but a pH fraction of H∗ the following holds: for at most an  fraction of
challenges c, A2PoS◦ correctly guesses c’s label (i.e., `guess = `c) in round t or earlier. Moreover
A2PoS◦ makes at most q
H
2 queries to H∗. We say ΛPoS◦(G, VC , w) is (m, t, , pH, qH)-hard if no
such APoS◦ exists.
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7.2 Φ Hardness Implies ΛPoS◦ Hardness
Before we show that lower bounds in the pebbling game Φ translate to lower bounds on the
labelling game ΛPoS◦ , let us first mention the other (trivial) direction.
Any pebbling strategy AΦ = {A1Φ,A2Φ} can be transformed into a labelling strategy
APoS◦ = {A1PoS◦ ,A2PoS◦} which has the same parallel time complexity and which uses w bits
of space in its initial state S0 for pebble in the initial state P0. The idea is to simply have
APoS◦ mimic AΦ’s strategy, computing a label whenever AΦ places a pebble.
I Proposition 6 ((trivial) hardness of ΛPoS◦ implies hardness of Φ). If an AΦ exists that (s, t, )-
wins the pebbling game Φ(G = (V,E), VC), then an APoS◦ exists which (m, t, , qH2 )-wins the
ΛPoS◦(G, VC , w) labelling game for any w, qH2 = |V | and
m = s · w
Proof. By Remark 6.1 we can assume A2Φ is a “greedy” adversary who never deletes pebbles,
and thus puts at most |V | pebbles on G during the entire game. If A1Φ outputs an initial
pebbling P0, then A1PoS◦ will output an initial state that contains all the labels of the pebbles
in P0
S0 = {`v : v ∈ P0} .
Note that |S0| = w · |P0| ≤ w · s as claimed. A2PoS◦ will also be greedy, i.e., store all the labels
it ever computes. In step i, when A2Φ puts fresh pebbles on Pi \ Pi−1, A2PoS◦ makes a parallel
query to H∗ to compute all the new labels {`v : v ∈ Pi \Pi−1}. In the round where A2Φ puts
a pebble on c, A2PoS◦ can compute and output `guess = `c. J
Proving the other direction – that pebbling lower bounds imply lower bounds on the labelling
game – is more challenging.
I Theorem 7 (hardness of Φ implies hardness of ΛPoS◦). For any α > 0, if the pebbling game
Φ(G, VC) is (s, t, )-hard, then the labelling game ΛPoS◦(G, VC , w) is (m, t, , 2−α, qH2 )-hard
where
m ≥ s · (w − 2(logN + log qH2 ))− α
Before we get to proof of this theorem, let us state what security it implies for PoS◦ using
the hardness of Φ as stated in Lemma 4.
I Corollary 8 (of Thm. 7 and Lem. 4). For G′4N , VC as in Lemma 4, and any ce ∈ [0, 1],
ΛPoS◦(G
′
4N , VC , w) is (m, t, , 2−α, qH2 )-hard
whith m = N · ce · (w − 2(logN + log qH2 ))− α , t = N ,  = ce + 4′
Let us observe that the hardness as stated is basically optimal. For slightly larger m = N · ce
(i.e., if we ignore the additive log terms), it means an adversary dedicating N · (1−4′−∆) ·w
(instead N · w) space after initialization will fail to answer a ∆ fraction of the challenges in
parallel time < N . Note that in 4N = |V | sequential time every challenge can be answered
with no storage at all by recomputing the entire labelling. As always, by challenging this
adversary on O(1/∆) queries in parallel we can amplify the probability of the adversary
failing to answer fast arbitrary close to 1.
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Proof of Theorem 7. To prove the theorem we assume an adversary APoS◦ = (A1PoS◦ ,A
2
PoS◦)
exists who (m, t, , 2−α, qH2 )-wins the labelling game. Let H,Pr[H∗ ∈ H] ≥ 2−α be the subset
of H∗ for which APoS◦ can win the labelling game like that, i.e., using an initial state of ≤ m
bits, in ≤ t rounds, and for an ≥  fraction of challenges where A2PoS◦ makes ≤ qH2 queries to
H∗ (cf. Definition 5).
We will consider the random experiment where for a given H∗ ∈ H, we first run A1PoS◦
to get S0, and then we run A2PoS◦ on all challenges in parallel. This will define a set F of
“fresh” labels, which are labels that occur during the execution before they have been actually
computed (and thus intuitively must somehow have been stored in the initial state S0). We
then prove two claims.
The first shows how the above execution translates into a strategy to (|F |, t, )-win he
the pebbling game, as this game is (s, t, )-hard, we have |F | ≥ s. The second claim shows
how to compress H∗ by almost |F | ·w bits when given the initial state S0. As most functions
are incompressible, we get m = ‖S0‖ ' s · w. We now give the detailed proof.
As outlined above, consider any H∗ ∈ H, and let S0 ← A1PoS◦ be the initial state. Let
V ′C ⊆ VC be the set of challenges which A2PoS◦(S0, ·) answers correctly in t rounds or less, as
H∗ ∈ H we have |V ′C | ≥ |VC |. In the proof we’ll consider two algorithms
A‖PoS◦ runs A
2
PoS◦ in parallel for all possible challenges c ∈ VC . Concretely, A
‖
PoS◦ invokes
|VC | instances of A2PoS◦(S0, c), one for every challenge c ∈ VC . In each round, A
‖
PoS◦
collects the queries made by all the instances of A2PoS◦ that have not yet terminated, then
makes one parallel query to H∗ containing all the collected queries, and forwards the
corresponding answers to the A2PoS◦ instances. We let A
‖
PoS◦ run for t rounds, and then
stop.
LG computes the labels `1, `2, . . . , `|V | in topological order, making sequential queries to H∗.
We refer to a query that correctly computes a label as in eq.(8), i.e., a query of the form
`i = H∗(i, ~`parents(i))
as a real query. For i ∈ V , we say i is fresh if in some round A‖PoS◦ uses a label `i as (part
of an) input to a query or the thread A2PoS◦(S0, i) outputs `i as its guess `guess = `i (note that
then i ∈ V ′C) before this label `i was received as output of a real query. Let F ⊆ V denote
the (indices of) the fresh labels. Thus, {`i}i∈F are all the labels that appear during A‖PoS◦ ’s
execution before they have been computed, i.e., received as output on a real query.
I Claim 9. There is an adversary AΦ that (s′, t, )-wins the pebbling game Φ(G, VC) with
s′ = |F | initial pebbles (thus |F | ≥ s).
Proof of Claim. Consider an A1Φ which choses an initial pebbling P0 = F . Then A2Φ in round
i puts a pebble on v if A‖PoS◦ received `v as output of a real query in round i. By construction
this is a valid parallel black pebbling.
We claim that this A2Φ puts a pebble on every node in V ′C in t steps or less, and thus
(s, t, )-wins Φ(G, VC). To see this, consider any c ∈ V ′C . If c ∈ F = P0 it’s pebbled already
in round 1. Otherwise, if c ∈ V ′C \ F , the label `guess = `c output by the thread A2PoS◦(S0, c)
was not fresh, and thus must have been received as output of a real query in some round
j ≤ t. By construction this A2Φ will have put a pebble on c in round no later than j. J
Now that we have shown |F | ≥ s, the next step is to lower bound ‖S0‖, the bitlength of the
initial state, in terms of |F |. For this, we show how to compress the function table of H∗ given
K. Z. Pietrzak 59:19
S0 by almost by almost |F | · w bits. Using the fact that a random oracle is incompressible
(cf. Fact 1 in §3), we’ll then derive a lower bound ‖S0‖ ' |F | · w. Let
[H∗] ∈ {0, 1}(2ι+1−1)×w
denote the function table of H∗ : {0, 1}≤ι → {0, 1}w.
I Claim 10. There exists an ecoding (enc, dec) which correctly decodes an 2−α fraction of
the tables
Pr
H∗
[dec(enc([H∗])) = [H∗]] ≥ 2−α
and the length of the encoding is ‖enc([H∗], S0)‖ ≤ ‖[H∗]‖+‖S0‖−|F | ·(w−2(logN+log qH2 )).
Before we prove this claim, let us observe this implies the statement of the theorem by using
Fact 1, which implies
‖S0‖ ≥ |F | · (w − 2(logN + log qH2 ))− α .
Proof of Claim. The encoding enc/dec will correctly decode all the [H∗] which are in H. For
this, enc([H∗]) first determines if H∗ ∈ H, and if this is not the case outputs whatever (say
the bit 0). Let B denote the following computation: we first invoke A‖PoS◦(S0, VC) followed
by LG , we’ll denote with q ≤ N · (qH2 + 1) the number of distinct H∗ queries made during B’s
execution (at most qH2 for each invocation of the N invocations of A
‖
PoS◦ and N more for LG).
Let the list ~c contain all the outputs of H∗ queries made during B. The outputs in ~c
are stored in the order the queries were made, and if a query is repeated, the output is not
stored. Let ~c denote the function table of H∗ with the |~c| w-bit entries that are in ~c removed.
Note that given ~c,~c, S0, VC′ we can recover [H∗] by running B using ~c to answer all the oracle
queries. After this, we have learned all the inputs corresponding to the outputs stored in ~c,
and thus know which queries were deleted from [H∗] to get ~c. Thus now we can recover all
of [H∗]. We haven’t compressed anything yet (as ‖~c‖+ ‖~c‖ = ‖[H∗]‖, or as all elements in
those sets and the table are w bit strings, equivalently |~c|+ |~c| = |[H∗]|). Next we’ll show
how to compress ~c into a smaler ~cF which, with some short extra information ~bF , will suffice
to answer all H∗ queries made during B correctly.
Recall that F ⊆ V are the fresh queries. Consider i ∈ F , at some point during the
evaluation of B the real query `i = H∗(i, ~`parents(i)) is made (the only reason we invoke LG as
part of B is to ensure this query is made at some point). As i ∈ F , at the point where this
query is made for the first time, we have already observed the value `i as part of some query
input. Let ~cF denote ~c, but with the |F | entries corresponding to the real queries of i ∈ F
deleted. With this ~cF we can answer all of B’s queries if we’re given some extra information
which, for every i ∈ F , tells as at which point during the execution of B we observe `i, and
where the corresponding real query is made. This extra information requires at most 2 log q
bits for every i ∈ F , let ~bF denote a string encoding this information, we now define the
encoding as
enc([H∗]) = (S0,~cF ,~bF ,~c)
The decoding dec(S0,~cF ,~bF ,~c) reconstructs [H∗] as outlined above. As
‖~cF ‖+ ‖~c‖ = ‖[H∗]‖ − w · |F |
‖~bF ‖ ≤ |F | · 2 log q′ ≤ |F | · 2(logN + log q)
the encoding length is ‖enc([H∗], S0)‖ ≤ ‖S0‖ + ‖[H∗]‖ − |F | · (w − 2(logN + log q)) as
claimed. J
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J
8 PoS Security of PoCSφ and PoR
In this section we extend the result from the previous section, and show that hardness
of Φ implies hardness of games ΛPoCSφ and ΛPoR, which capture the PoS security of our
constructions PoCSφ and PoR. We start with defining the games
8.1 The Labelling Games ΛPoCSφ and ΛPoR
Let PoXX ∈ {PoCSφ,PoR}. The game is parameterized by a DAG G = (V,E), a subset
VC ⊆ V of |VC | = N challenge nodes and a block size w. Moreover a function H∗ : {0, 1}≤ι →
{0, 1}w, ι = (δ + 2) · w. The game is played by an adversary APoXX = {A1PoXX,A2PoXX}.
initialization: A1PoXX is given oracle access to H∗. It can choose any data ~d = {di}i∈VC , di ∈
{0, 1}w, which defines labels ~` to store as in eq.(3) and eq.(4), but using H∗ instead
Hχ. Recall that for this we first compute (φ~d, φ
+
~d
) := commitH∗(~d), now let H∗,φ~d be the
function H∗,φ~d(·) ≡ H∗(φ~d, ·), and then compute ~` as
(if PoXX = PoR) ~`= {`i}i∈VC where `i =
{
H∗,φ~d(i, ~`parents(i)) if i ∈ V \ VC
H∗,φ~d(i, ~`parents(i))⊕ di˜ if i ∈ VC
(if PoXX = PoCSφ) ~`= {`′i}i∈VC where ∀i ∈ V : `i = H∗,φ~d(i, ~`parents(i))
∀i ∈ VC : `′i = `i ⊕ di˜
A1PoXX outputs a string (the initial state) S0 of length ‖S0‖ = m bits.
execution: A random challenge node c← VC is chosen.
A2PoXX gets as input S0 and challenge c. It then proceeds in rounds starting with i = 1:
In round i, APoXX gets as input its state Si−1. It can either decide to stop the game by
outputting a single guess `guess (for `c in PoR or `′c in PoCSφ), or it can make one parallel
oracle query: on query (x1, . . . , xqi) it receives (y1, . . . , yqi) where yi = H∗(xi). It can
do any amount of computation before and after this query, and at the end of the round
output its state Si for the next round.
I Definition 11 (hardness of the games ΛPoXX ∈ {ΛPoR,ΛPoCSφ}). For m, t, qH1 , qH2 , w ∈ N and
pH,  ∈ [0, 1], we say APoXX = (A1PoXX,A2PoXX) does (m, t, , pH, qH1 , qH2 )-win the labelling game
ΛPoXX(G, VC , w) (as defined above) if for all but a pH fraction of H∗ the following holds: for at
most an  fraction of challenges c, A2PoXX correctly guesses c’s label (i.e., `guess = `c) in round
t or earlier. Moreover A1PoXX and A2PoXX make at most qH1 and qH2 queries to H∗, respectively.
We say ΛPoXX(G, VC , w) is (m, t, , pH, qH1 , qH2 )-hard if no such APoXX exists.
8.2 Φ Hardness Implies ΛPoR and ΛPoCSφ Hardness
I Theorem 12 (hardness of Φ implies hardness of ΛPoR&ΛPoCSφ). For any α > 0, if the
pebbling game Φ(G, VC) is (s, t, )-hard, then the labelling game ΛPoR(G, VC , w) and also the
labelling game ΛPoCSφ(G, VC , w) is (m, t, , 2−α + qH1 2/2w, qH1 , qH2 )-hard where
m ≥ s · (w − 2(logN + log qH2 ))− α
Before we get to proof of this theorem, let us state what security it implies for PoR and
PoCSφ using the hardness of Φ as stated in Lemma 4.
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I Corollary 13 (of Thm. 7 and Lem. 4). For G′4N , VC as in Lemma 4, and any ce ∈ [0, 1],
ΛPoCSφ(G
′
4N , VC , w) and ΛPoR(G
′
4N , VC , w) are (m, t, , 2−α, qH2 )-hard
whith m = N · ce · (w − 2(logN + log qH2 ))− α , t = N ,  = ce + 4′
Proof. We assume the reader is familiar with the proof of Theorem 7, as we will only explain
how that proof needs to be adapted.
The proof of Theorem 7 goes through almost unchanged for PoXX ∈ {PoR,PoCSφ}
instead of PoS◦, the point where it fails is when we need to compress fresh labels. In the
proof of Theorem 7 every fresh label `i, i ∈ F allowed us to compress one element of H∗. Now
the situation is seemingly more complicated. For concreteness, let’s consider PoR. Now even
if the encoding enc observes a fresh label `i when invoking A‖PoR (which is defined analogous
to A‖PoS◦ in the proof of Theorem 7), it’s not clear how to compress one entry of H∗,φ~d ’s
function table as now
`i = H∗,φ~d(i, ~`parents(i))⊕ di˜
only provides an output that is blinded with di˜. If we could make sure the encoding and
decoding enc/dec knew the ~d, this problem would disappear. We fix this problem as follows.
We define A‖PoR analogous to A
‖
PoS◦ , i.e., it runs A
2
PoR(S0, c) on all challenges c ∈ VC in parallel.
But additionally, at the very beginning (before invoking the A2PoR’s), it invokes A1PoR, but
only runs it to the point where the commitment φ~d is received as on output of H∗ (recall we
assume A1PoR follows the protocol, so this commitment must be computed at some point).
This way enc/dec, wo invoke A‖PoR, learn the entire ~d, as it can be extracted from the H∗
queries leading to φ~d. At the same time A1PoR will almost certainly not have made any
H∗,φ~d(·) = H∗(φ~d, ·) queries as φ~d is uniform and we stop executing A1PoR once φ~d is received.
This is necessary, so a label that was fresh without running A1PoR first, will still be fresh if
we do run A1PoR. The above argument works as long as A1PoR doesn’t find a collision in H∗
(otherwise we can’t extract a unique ~d). For this reason in the theorem security holds only
for a slightly smaller pH = 2−α + qH1
2
/2w fraction of the H∗ than the pH = 2−α fraction we
got for the ΛPoS◦ game in Theorem 7. J
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A Discussion and Motivation
A.1 The Quest for a Sustainable Blockchain
PoW based blockchains, most notably Bitcoin, have been critisized as the mining process
(required to secure the blockchain) results in a massive energy waste. This is not only
problematic ecologically, but also economically, as it requires high rewards for the miners to
compensate for this energy loss.8
A.1.1 Proofs of Stake
The idea behind “Nakamoto consensus” used in Bitcoin, is to randomly chose a miner to
generate the next block, where the probability of any miner to be chosen is proportional to
its hashing power. The most investigated idea to replace PoWs in blockchains are “proofs of
stake” (PoStake), where the idea is to choose the winner proportional to the fraction of coins
they hold. At first, this idea looks promising, but it seems to be difficult to actually realize it
in a secure and efficient way. Early ad-hoc implementations of this idea include Peercoin [22]
and NXT [31]. More recent proposals come with security proofs in various models [25, 12, 20],
but those protocols are fairly complicated, and basically run a byzantine agreement protocol
amongst rotating subsets of the miners, thus losing the appealing simplicity of Bitcoin, where
a winning miner simply gossips the next block and no other interaction is required.
8 The block reward currently used as main compensation for miners in Bitcoin is decreasing (it’s halved
every four years), and thus ultimately will be replaced with only transaction fees, which might create
serious problems [11].
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A.1.2 Space as a Resource
After time, space is the best investigated resource in computational complexity, it’s thus
only natural to try using disk space as a resource for mining. This has the potential to
give blockchains which are much more sustainable than PoW based designs, while avoiding
at least some of the technical issues that PoStake has. Permacoin [26] requires a miner to
dedicate disk space, but it’s still a proof of work based design, only now the computation
itself (which is a so called “proof of retrievability”) requires access to a large disk. A proposal
which mostly uses space as resource is Burstcoin [2], this design is poorly document, but it
seems to have security and efficiency issues.9 Another suggestion are “proofs of space” (PoS),
which are the topic of this paper and we’ll discuss them in more detail below in §A.1.4.
A.1.3 Useful Proofs
While PoStake aim to avoid wasting significant resources for mining in the first place, another
approach to minimize the footprint of mining is to use the resources required to sustain the
blockchain for something useful. A intriguing idea is to use the computing power wasted for
PoWs for solving actual computational problems, we refer the reader to [8] and the references
therein. In this work we also follow this approach and construct “proofs of catalytic space”
(PoCS), which are defined like PoS, but where most of the space required by the prover can
be used to store useful data.
A.1.4 Proofs of Space (PoS)
Proofs of space (PoS) [16] are proofs systems that were developed to serve as a replacement
for PoW in blockchain designs. The first proposal of a PoS-based blockchain is Spacemint [27],
a recent ongoing effort which combines PoS with some type of proofs of sequential work is
the Chia network [1]. A PoS [16] is a two stage protocol between a prover P and a verifier
V. The first phase is an intialization protocol which is run only once, after which P has
initalized its space. Then there’s a proof execution phase which typically is run many times,
in which an honest prover P can efficiently convince the verifier that dedicates the space.
The verifier V is required to be very efficient during both phases, this means it can be
polynomial in some security parameter, but should be almost independent (i.e., depend at
most polylogarithmically) on the size N of the space committed by the prover. The honest
prover P is required to be very efficient during the execution phases. During the initialization
P cannot be very efficient, as it must at the very least overwrite all of the claimed space, but
it shouldn’t require much more than that.
To date two very different types of PoS have been suggested. PoS-based on hard to
pebble graphs [16, 30] and PoS-based on inverting random functions [3], the new proofs
systems – for proofs of catalytic space (PoCS) and proofs of replication (PoR) – we propose
in this work extend the pebbling-based PoS. We leave it as an open problem to extend
9 [27, Appendix B of the full version] discusses some issues with (our best guess on what is) Burst and
the underlying proof system called “proofs of capacity” (PoC). In a nutshell, PoC are rather inefficient
as the prover needs to access a constant (albeit small) fraction of the entire space for generating
a proof, and verification requires over a Million hashes. As to security, PoC allow for strong time-
memory trade-offs (a recent ad-hoc fix https://www.burst-coin.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/
The-Burst-Dymaxion-1.00.pdf claims to address at least the most obvious time-memory attacks
outlined in [27]). But most worryingly, the blockchain designs seems to have no mechanisms to address
nothing-at-stake issues, which are responsible for the most delicate and complicated issue of any
blockchain design not based on proofs of work.
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the [3] PoS to PoR and PoCS, this would be very interesting as although the [3] PoS has
worse asymptotic security than pebbling-based PoS, but it’s much more efficient (with proofs
of length a few hundred bits, and proof generation and verification requiring just a small
constant number of hash queries). Moreover, unlike pebbling-based PoS, this PoS has a
non-interactive initialization phase, which makes it easier to use it for a blockchain design
where we have no dedicated verifier, and thus the proof must be made non-interactive.10
10Concretely, for subtle security reasons Spacemint [27] (which uses the pebbling-based PoS) requires the
miners to commit to the transcript of a challenge response protocol which is run during the initialization
phase. This is done by uploading this (short) transcript to the blockchain. The Chia network which are
based on [3] will not require any such commitments.
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